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II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Utah Court of Appeals in City
Brent

Allen

Turner,

of St.

George v.

Case No. 890620-CA, (filed June 6, 1991, Utah

Court of Appeals) reversed the decision of Judge Mower of the
Fifth Circuit Court, St. George Department denying Brent Allen
Turners Motion to Dismiss the criminal Complaint against him.
Mr. Turner was charged with violation of the St. George City
Obscenity Ordinance, Ordinance No. 2-77-2.

Mr. Turner's Motion

to Dismiss before Judge Mower was based upon the argument that
the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face, or had been
applied unconstitutionally to Mr. Turner.

The Utah Court of

Appeals, exercising the independent appellate review mandated by
the United States Supreme Court, determined that the statute was
constitutional on its face, but had been unconstitutionally
applied to Mr. Turner.

(See pages 1, 7-8 of the Utah Court of

Appeals opinion in Case No. 890620-CA, attached hereto as
Appendix 1.)
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III.
WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED
A.

PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF

RULE 49, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Both the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and prior
case law of this Court make it abundantly clear that a party
petitioning for a writ of certiorari must precisely follow the
rules with regard to the form of the petition, and must
specifically set forth the reasons why the writ should issue.
Lee v. Provo City

Civil

Service

Commission,

In

582 P.2d 485 (Utah

1978), this Court stated:
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction
that pleadings seeking relief by way of
certiorari must specifically designate the .
. . abuse of discretion claimed and that
pleadings that merely set forth conclusions
are to be dismissed.
Id.

at 582. Additionally, Rule 49(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure directs petitioner to set forth:

"A direct

and concise argument explaining the special and important reasons
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the writ."
goes on to state at sub-paragraph lOe that:
"The failure of a petitioner to present with
accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is
essential to a ready and adequate
understanding of the points requiring
consideration will be a sufficient reason for
denying the petition."
2

Rule 49

The City of St. George's petition for a writ of
certiorari in this case fails to set forth concisely or otherwise
exactly what the Utah Court of Appeals did wrong and why, and
fails to identify reasons why this Court should review the Court
of Appeals' decision.

Although the petition sets forth in a

rambling unsupported fashion a litany of conclusions regarding
what the Utah Court of Appeals really should have done, the

m

petition never sets forth in what respect the Utah Court of
Appeals' decision deviated from the recognized standard.

The

petition is, in every respect, no more than the City's
unsupported notions of what the law ought to be, rather than what
the law is. At no point does the petition concisely and
accurately set forth the reasons under Rule 46 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure why certiorari should be granted.

The

petition is actually just a reargument of the City's position as
set forth to the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the petition

should be denied.

B.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD OF

REVIEW
Giving petitioner every benefit of the doubt,
apparently petitioner contends that the Utah Court of Appeals did
not utilize the correct standard of review when considering the
3

Circuit Court's decision to deny Turner's Motion to Dismiss.
That argument, however, ignores the clear pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court which have directly and unequivocally
addressed this very issue.
This Court need not look beyond the Utah Court of
Appeals' decision and the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in two cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals
appropriately considered Mr. Turner's appeal.
First, in Jenkins

v. Georgia,

2d 642 (1974), a case decided after

418 U.S. 153, 41 L. Ed.

Miller

v. California,

413

U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973) upon which petitioner so
persistently relies, the United States Supreme Court concisely
set forth what the role of appellate courts should be when
reviewing convictions for violations of local obscenity
ordinances and statutes.

In Jenkins

the Court considered Mr.

Jenkins' conviction under a Georgia obscenity statute and faced
the precise argument that the City of St. George is attempting in
this case.

Georgia argued that the decision of the jury, as the

trier of fact applying local community standards, should stand
and should not be reviewed independently at the appellate level.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, cited extensively to
Miller

v. California,

and announced that appellate courts have

the right and duty to conduct an independent review of the facts
4

to ensure that only hard core depictions of sexual conduct will
be the subject of prosecution, regardless of what local juries
may deem fit or appropriate.

The United States Supreme Court,

Justice Renquist writing for the majority stated:
Even though questions of appeal to 'prurient
interest or of patent offensiveness' are
essentially questions of fact, it would be a
serious misreading of Miller to conclude that
juries have unbridled discretion in
determining what is 'patently offensive'.
Not only did we there say that 'the First
Amendment values applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment are
adequately protected by the ultimate
power of

appellate
courts to conduct an independent
review of constitutional
claims when

necessary'
(citations omitted) but we made it
plain under that holding 'no one will be

subject to prosecution for the sale or
exposure of obscene materials unless these
materials depict or describe
patently
offensive hard core sexual
conduct'.
(Citations omitted.)
Id.

at 650.

(Emphasis added.)

In spite of the United States'

Supreme Court warning that it would be a serious misreading of
Miller

to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion, that is

precisely what the City of St. George has done.
the City states:

In its petition

"The sensitive issue of standards in a

particular community should not be infringed upon once the
court's initial constitutional review shows that it may be
possible for obscenity to exist."
certiorari at 13-14.)

(See petition for writ of

That statement is patently contrary to the
5

United States Supreme Court's pronouncement that an independent
review of constitutional claims is permitted by appellate courts
and that juries do not have unbridled discretion in determining
what is patently offensive and therefore, obscene.
its obligation under Jenkins,

Recognizing

the Utah Court of Appeals stated:

"Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of 'hard coreness that
must be meet.'"
decision.)

(See page 6 of the Utah Court of Appeals'

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals recognized and

quoted directly from Jenkins

stating:

When determining what appeals to the prurient
interest and what is patently offensive, the
jury is not allowed unbridled discretion.
Jenkins
v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).
The trial judge has a significant role in
defining the extent of the jury's discretion.
'Application of the obscenity standards
involves a subjective element on the part of
the tribunal—judge, jury or both—making the
critical determination.' (Citations
omitted.) In addition, jury discretion is
subject to independent appellate review, when
necessary, and by the requirement that only
depictions of patently offensive hard core
sexual conduct be subject to prosecution.
Jenkins,
418 U.S. at 160. Therefore, in
Jenkins,
the Supreme Court did not hesitate
to invade the province of the jury, which the
Georgia Supreme Court had refused to do.
Id.

at 6.

The Utah Court of Appeals' ennunciation of the

standard of review precisely mirrors what the United States
Supreme Court mandated in

Jenkins.

6

Additionally, in Bose Corp.
Inc.,

v. Consumers Union of

U.S.

466 U.S. 485, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984), the United States

Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection in Jenkins

of the

contention that a jury finding of obscenity is insulated from
review so long as the jury was properly instructed and there is
some evidence to support its findings.

On the contrary, the

United States Supreme Court held that an independent examination
of the evidence by the appellate court was appropriate.

The

court in Bose stated:
We expressly recognize the 'ultimate power of
appellate courts to conduct an independent
review of constitutional claims when
necessary'.
(Citations omitted.) We have
therefore
rejected
the contention
that a jury
finding of obscenity
vel non is
insulated
from review so long as the jury was
properly
instructed
and there is some evidence
to
support its findings,
holding
that
substantive
constitutional
limitations
govern.
In Jenkins v. Georgia,
(citations
omitted) based on an independent
examination
of the evidence
. f . . the Court held that the
film in question
could not, as a matter of
constitutional
law, be found to depict
sexual
conduct in a patently
offensive
way.'
(Citations omitted.)
Id.

at 506-507.

(Emphasis added.)

This Court should likewise

reject petitioner's argument that a jury verdict in an obscenity
case is insulated from independent appellate review.
The Utah Court of Appeals held exactly as the Court did
in Jenkins,

utilizing exactly the same language:
7

Our review of the evidence leads us to the
conclusion that, as a matter of law, these
renderings are not public portrayals of hard
core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for
the ensuing commercial gain. Jenkins,
418
U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller,
413 U.S. at 35).
(See Appendix 1, the Utah Court of Appeals opinion, at page 8.)
Petitioner's suggestion that the Utah Court of Appeals expanded,
or misapplied the standard of review mandated by the United
States Supreme Court is unsupportable.

Rather, the Utah Court of

Appeals undertook the same level and nature of appellate review
mandated by Jenkins

and reaffirmed in Bose.

IV.
CONCLUSION
St. George has failed to concisely and accurately
articulate reasons why this Court should issue a writ of
certiorari.

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, there is no

good reason under Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate procedure or
under any other recognizable authority for this Court to issue a
writ of certiorari in this matter.
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OPINION
(For Publication)

City of St. George,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890620-CA

Brent Allen Turner,
F I L E D
( J u n e 6, 1991)

Defendant and Appellant.

Fifth Circuit, St. George Department
The Honorable David L. Mower
Attorneys:

Michael P. Zaccheo, Salt Lake City, for Appellant,
Alan B. Boyack, St. George, for Appellant
T. M. Shumway, St. George, for Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Brent Allen Turner, appeals his conviction of
displaying an obscene picture depicting sexual conduct in
violation of St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2. We reverse,
FACTS
Turner operated a retail business in St. George, Utah,
vending hard rock record albums and T-shirts. Turner's small,
signless store was open during evening hours only. He was
charged with violating the St. George obscenity ordinance for
his display of three painted bed sheets which he used as wall
hangings and which were visible to anyone entering the shop.
Several people made their "artistic" contributions to the
sheets as they hung on the wall. The sheets appear to be a

collage consisting of various drawings and slogans in different
sizes and styles. The paint appears to have been sprayed or
brushed on. The pictures and slogans appear crude and
simplistic. Several factors make some of the slogans and
drawings impossible to discern from the record: the quality of
the photographs in the exhibit, the draping of the sheets, and
the fact that some stereo speakers appear in front of the
sheets in the photographs. The slogans and drawings appear
intended to confront and to offend, and are related to sexual,
political, religious, and social themes.
The portion of the
wall hangings that the prosecution claims violates the St,
George ordinance supposedly portrays a woman reclining in a
spread-eagled manner so as to expose her "pubic area,"
represented by three or four black paint spots. The face and
head of the figure could conceivably be that of a dog. Next to
the drawing of the woman is what has been represented to be an
enlarged drawing of a woman's pubic area. Both renditions are
crudely drawn, blurry and indistinct. The quality of the
renderings could best be compared to the graffiti and drawings
frequently found on the walls of a junior high school rest
room.
Turner was charged with violating St. George City
Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 §§ 2a(l) and (2). The relevant
portions of this lengthy ordinance are as follows:
No person shall knowingly: (1) Distribute,
display publicly, furnish or provide to
any person any obscene material or
performance.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § 2a(l).
defined as

"Obscene" is

1. The slogans include "Nuke My Ass," "Your [sic] Afraid Face
it," "Group Sex," "Total Peace," "Fuck Authority," "Burn the
Dead," "Eat It," "Live-Die Airborne," "Hell House," "Kill for
God," "Run and Hide Death Will Find You!," "Sold Your Soul,"
"White Flys [sic] Will Eat Your Flesh," "The End," "And Unto
You I Dedicate My Heart," and "My Right to The World." The
drawings include a peace symbol, an MX missile, a swastika,
some gravestones, some crosses, some international prohibitive
symbols over the words "life" and "drugs," a smiling face, a
gun, several skulls, some with cross bones, some with full
skeletons, a door, a mushroom cloud, and a moon.
2. The dissent's description of the two drawings gives the
impression one is looking at an explicit medical illustration

890620-CA

any material or performance which, when
taken as a whole and considered in the
context of the contemporary standards of
this community:
(1) Appeals to prurient interest in sex;
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently
offensive manner;
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § la. The ordinance
provides a lengthy definition of "sexual conduct," the relevant
portion of which is as follows:
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory
function or lewd exhibition of the
genitals, including any explicit close-up
representation of a human genital organ or
a spread eagle exposure of female genital
organs.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le (emphasis added).
A jury found Turner guilty. He now appeals his
conviction on the grounds that (1) the obscenity ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied to him, and (2) the ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

(Footnote 2 continued)
from Gray's Anatomy, or viewing an exact photograph of the area
in question, leaving no room for dispute as to what the
renditions depict. Such is simply not the case. The second
drawing, described in such intimate detail, could just as
easily be viewed as a beetle, a leaf, or a Zulu war shield. Or
it might more closely resemble a fugitive ink blot from the
Rorschach test ("A personality and intelligence test in which a
subject interprets ten standard black or colored inkblot
designs and reveals through his selectivity the manner in which
intellectual and emotional factors are integrated in his
perception of environmental stimuli." Webster's Medical Desk
Dictionary (1986)). Because the drawings were sufficiently
abstract so as to permit a variety of nonobscene
interpretations, and because of the other reasons enumerated
later in this opinion, the judge, as a matter of law, should
have never permitted the issue to go to the jury.

890620-CA
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FIRST AMENDMENT
In a case where we are required to weigh important first
amendment values of freedom of speech against a charge of
obscenity based on a statute or ordinance that is properly
limited, we exercise independent review when necessary, and
determine, as a matter of constitutional law, whether the
material is to be protected. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
160 (1974).3
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court set forth its definition of obscenity.
The standard has been elaborated in subsequent cases, and it
remains the standard for distinguishing between speech, which
is protected by the first amendment of the United States .
Constitution, and obscenity, which is not considered speech and
receives no such protection. Id. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957).5

3. "[T]he First Amendment values applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by
the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary."
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). See also, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163-64
(Brennan, J. concurring).
4. For example, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades. Inc., 472 U.S.
491 (1985) (elaboration of prurient interest); and Jenkins, 418
U.S. 153 (elaboration of community standards).
5. The prosecution argues that, because the record shop is
near a school and because minors are likely to frequent the
shop, we should apply the lower standard suggested in Erznoznik
v- CitY Of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (discussing
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations of speech).
However, the St. George ordinance fails to regulate the time,
place, or manner that sexually explicit material may be
displayed, but instead, it places a content-based restriction
on any display of sexually explicit material. Consequently, we
must apply the stricter test set forth in Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
Additionally, because the shop is unmarked and is only open
evenings, when school is not in session, it does not appear
that minors are especially likely to frequent the shop.

890620-CA

The Miller test is as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (quotations and citations omitted). The Miller
test is basically incorporated into the St. George ordinance,
except that the ordinance defines "sexual conduct" in ways not
specifically mentioned in Miller. Specifically, the St. George
ordinance prohibits the display of "any explicit close-up
representation of . . . a spread eagle exposure of female
genital organs." St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le.
However, among the "plain examples" given by the Miller court
as to what a statute or ordinance can define for regulation as
patently offensive sexual conduct was the "lewd exhibition of
the genitals." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. We find that, insofar
as the definition describes materials that "depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core* sexual conduct" and insofar as
that sexual conduct passes muster under the Miller test, which
it must under section 1(a) of the ordinance, the ordinance is
within constitutional limits.6 Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 27).
PRURIENT INTEREST AND
PATENTLY OFFENSIVE
The first prong of the Miller analysis requires the trier
of fact to determine whether the "'average person, applying
contemporary community standards1 would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
6. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not consider
whether the depiction at issue is lewd.

ooncjn_r&
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Material that appeals to the prurient interest does not
include "material that provoke[s] only normal, healthy sexual
desires." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades. Inc.. 472 U.S. 491, 498
(1985). Rather, it applies to material that provokes "sexual
responses over and beyond those that would be characterized as
normal." Id. Specifically, "prurience may be constitutionally
defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which
appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex . . . ." Id,
at 504.
The second prong of the Miller analysis is "whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."
Miller. 413 U.S. at 24.
When determining what appeals to the prurient interest
and what is patently offensive, the jury is not allowed
unbridled discretion. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160
(1974). The trial judge has a significant role in defining the
extent of the jury's discretion. "Application of the obscenity
standard involves a subjective element on the part of the
tribunal—judge, jury or both—making the critical
determination." Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 397
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)). In addition, jury discretion is subject to
independent appellate review, when necessary, and by the
requirement that only depictions of patently offensive hard
core sexual conduct be subject tp prosecution. Jenkins, 418
U.S. at 160. Therefore, in Jenkins, the Supreme Court did not
hesitate to invade the province of the jury, which the Georgia
Supreme Court had refused to do. In overturning the verdict,
the Supreme Court ruled that the jury did not have sole
discretion to determine that the film Carnal Knowledge was
obscene, and substituted its judgment for that of the jury
because, it concluded, it was "simply not the 'public portrayal
of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain' which we said was punishable in
Miller." 418 U.S. at 162 (quoting MiUfii, 413 U.S. at 35).
Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of "hard-corenessthat must be met.
Not only must the statute or ordinance be
constitutionally explicit, but the trial court has the
responsibility to make a threshold determination as to whether
a work may depict hard-core sexual conduct. Only after the
court has reached this conclusion is it appropriate to turn the
matter over to the jury to apply the first two prongs of the

Miller test.
correctly made
Jenkins.
The
dismiss, found

Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court
the threshold determination contemplated in
court, in its pretrial order denying a motion to
that "the words and drawing described herein

7. in a recent case, State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7
(1991), the Utah Supreme Court commented on the distinctions
between the overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury.
Even though Ramirez was concerned with the admission of
eyewitness identification, we find the court's comments
appropriate here where the trial court has to make a
preliminary determination of obscenity when that same issue
will have to be redetermined by the jury when the evidence is
considered:
Potential for role confusion and for
erosion of constitutional guarantees
inheres in this overlap of responsibility
of judge and jury to determine the same
issue. Because the jury is not bound by
the judge's preliminary factual
determination made in ruling on
admissibility[/obscenity] the trial court
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize
proffered evidence for constitutional
defects and may simply admit the evidence,
leaving all questions pertinent to its
reliabilityf/obscenity] to the jury. But
courts cannot properly sidestep their
responsibility to perform the required
constitutional admissibility[/obscenity3
analysis. To do so would leave protection
of constitutional rights to the whim of a
jury and would abandon the courts'
responsibility to apply the law.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.
8. "Judges . . . must take care lest they decide these cases
on the basis simply of their indignation and disgust with the
kind of trash presented. The First Amendment extends to trash,
if it stops short of obscenity . . . ." Huffman, 470 F.2d at
396. Even though a piece may be "dismally unpleasant, uncouth
and tawdry," that alone "is not enough to make [it]
•obscene. "• Manual Enter, v. Dav, 370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962).

onrt^in /"»*
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arguably suggest an act which would constitute a violation of
the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital contact."
While the spray painted drawings depict representations
of genitalia, the drawings are too crudely rendered to be
salacious or titillating or to provoke sexual responses, normal
or healthy, much less those that are "over and beyond those
that would be characterized as normal." Brockett, 472 U.S. at
498. "Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the
States1 broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The arresting officer
admitted as much at trial. Even though the drawings are
vulgar, offensive, and confrontational, they are too sketchy
and abstract to appeal "to a shameful or morbid interest in
sex." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.9 The trial court's pretrial
finding of an "arguable suggestion" is not sufficient to meet
the constitutional test, and our own review of the evidence
leads us to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, these
renderings are not "public portrayal[s] of hard-core sexual
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial
gain." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at
35) .
Moreover, we cannot judge the drawings in isolation, but
must also consider the written material and other symbols
because Miller requires us to view the collage "taken as a
whole" in determining its appeal, to the prurient interest. 413
U.S. at 24. In Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972), 10 the
9. "The First Amendment protection for the depiction of nude
women applies even . . . where the pictures focus upon the
pubic areas and poses are struck in such a way as to emphasize
the female genitalia." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 401.
10. Although Kois preceded Miller, Miller frequently cites the
case with approval, indicating an intent to reaffirm the
decision and its analysis. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23, 24, 25, 26,
35, 37. Also, the test in Kois was whether "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Kois, 408 U.S. at 230 (quoting Roth v. United
Stafcfifi, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). Although this phrase
implies that the Kois phrase "taken as a whole" applies only to
the first part of the Miller test, the crux of Kois was whether
an allegedly obscene depiction had political value. We think
the Kflia analysis of "taken as a whole" is helpful in both the
first and third prongs of the Miller test.

Supreme Court considered the context in which an allegedlyobscene work was displayed. Kois involved the publication of a
photograph of an embracing nude couple, similar to one
confiscated by a Wisconsin district attorney. Because the
accompanying article was about the confiscation, the Court held
that the picture was newsworthy and thus protected. Laying a
foundation for what would later be the third prong of the
Miller analysis, the Court held that context could redeem an
otherwise obscene picture, where there is some contextual
relativity between the offending portion and the rest of the
work: "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication."
408 U.S. at 231. The Court held that because the picture was
"rationally related" and "relevant to the theme of the
article," it was "clearly entitled" to protection. Id.
Here, the two drawings do not appear as a sham attempt to
insulate obscene material with protected material. That is,
while the two drawings may be more confrontational and vulgar
than what appears on the rest of the bedsheets, they are not
entirely out of context with the other depictions of political,
philosophical, musical, social and sexual themes. Because the
work is a collage, there is not a close relationship among all
the slogans and symbols. However, a close relationship is not
the requirement; a rational relationship is. Kois, 407 U.S. at
231. n
The two drawings meet the Kois test because they
rationally relate to the immediate context (the wall hangings)
and to the broader context (the record store). The immediate
context is a collage of various symbols and phrases. The
broader context is that of a hard rock record store which vends
heavy metal music, which music is intended, in part, to
challenge traditional ideas and modes of thinking.
Therefore, even if we were to concede, which we do not,
that the two key drawings appeal to the prurient interest and
are patently offensive, we cannot see how the entire collage,
taken as a whole, is so.
11. The Kois Court's use of the phrase "rationally related"
suggests a low level of integration between an offending
picture and its larger context. See E. Main, The Neglected
Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary,
Artistic, Political, or Scientific Value, 11 S. 111. Univ. L.J.
1159, 1163-64 (1987).
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Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that the
drawings themselves do not appeal to the prurient interest and
are not patently offensive, and because the drawings rationally
relate to the rest of the collage, which, taken as a whole, is
not patently offensive and does not appeal to the prurient
interest, we find that the drawings are not in violation of the
St. George ordinance.
e conviction,

Regnal W

Garff, Judge.

I CONCUR:

« w

Gregorj^K. Orme, Judge

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
INTRODUCTION
I would affirm Mr. Turner's conviction. He was tried by a
jury of his peers and found guilty of violating an ordinance
which specifically defined constitutionally obscene materials.
Mr. Turner was provided fair notice that lewd exhibition of
human genitals to the St. George public, including spread-eagle
exposure of female genital organs, would bring prosecution.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) provides "plain
examples of what a state statute [or city ordinance] could
define [as obscenity] for regulation . . . ." One of Miller's
plain examples of "hard core" sexual conduct is representation
of "lewd exhibition of the genitals." Ixl. Thus, the trial
judge could reasonably determine that the ordinance contained a
constitutionally proper and specific definition of obscenity
and that Turner's exhibition of the nude spread-eagle female
and a separate enlarged detailed vulva with open vagina,
exposed labia and clitoris was in violation of the
constitutionally valid ordinance. Accordingly, the trial judge
properly submitted the case to the jury for determination after
denying a pretrial motion to dismiss based only on submission
of Turner's drawings and the city ordinance. The jury saw the
materials, heard the evidence and determined that Turner's
materials were obscene and that he had displayed them to
unwarned members of the public in violation of the city

ordinance. *FACTS
The statement of "facts" in the main opinion reads like a
subjective treatise in art appreciation, assessing the quality
of Turner's art work as "crude," "simplistic," "abstract,"
"indistinct" and "blurry." However, this attack of adjectives
is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has not indicated that
tasteful, mature, high quality obscenity should be suppressed
or that untasteful, immature, low quality obscenity should go
without regulation. On the other hand, the opinion does
recognize that the "indistinct" drawing is in fact "a woman
reclining in a spread-eagled manner (facing the viewer) so as
to expose her pubic area." The opinion also recognizes the
1. Since Turner accepted the jury instructions "as
constituted," no exceptions, I must conclude that the jury was
properly instructed regarding applicable law.
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drawing next to the woman as a large depiction of a woman's
pubic area but evaluates it as "blurry." These observations
are highly relevant. This "blurry" drawing (in shades of red
and pink) graphically depicts all of the external female
genitalia. This vulva is surrounded by depictions of pubic
hair done in black. "Genitalia," the word in Miller and the
St. Georae ordinance, means the reproductive organs, especially
the external sex organs. The American Heritage Dictionary,
Second College Edition 553 (1985). Despite the majority's
protestation in footnote 2 that Turner's depictions might
resemble something else, Turner testified that they were a nude
woman and an enlargement of a "girl's vagina."
Turner's vulva depiction occupies the center of the sheet
(side to side) with the top of the vulva at the center of,the
sheet (top to bottom). On the lower half of the sheet, the
left third is occupied by the words of a question with the nude
woman underneath. The question done in black over yellow is:
"Why Not Let
Some One Else
Think For You?"
The upper half of the vulva and pubic hair depiction is
immediately to the right of the three lines in the question.
Between the question and the nude woman is: "Tuna Factory x x
x x" inscribed in a green banner over her head. Between the
nude woman and the vulva is a small sign post with the words
"Tunnel of Love" and a yellow atrow points from the sign to the
lower half of the vulva and pubic hair. Underneath the vulva
and hair are the words "Keep Out" in red. To the right of the
vulva and hair in black are the words:
"It's
Mine
All Mine"
The upper half of the sheet has these slogans across the top
(left to right): "My Right to the World," "Your (sic) Afraid
Face It" and HLive For Yourself" and a round bomb with "Drugs"
inscribed on it. Underneath these items and across the lower
portion of the upper half (left to right) are a skull, a
swastika, a "13," a happy face, and a shield with "AA" on it.
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The majority disposes of the juryfs verdict by virtue of a
"hard core" attack (without defining hard core) and by use

of a "loose" definition of the scope of appellate review in
mounting the attack. Their opinion, citing Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), states that "the jury is not allowed
unbridled discretion" in making its obscenity determination.
Then the majority claims that Jenkins demonstrates that the
appellate court should "not hesitate to invade the province of
the jury" and to "substitute its judgment" for the jury's
judgment because the jury "does not have sole discretion" to
make the obscenity determination. I will first discuss scope
of appellate review and then address the meaning of "hard core"
and the "average person test" in response to the above
posturing of the main opinion. Later in my opinion I will
reach the main opinion's backup position regarding the context
of Turner's work taken "as a whole."
I agree that the jury does not have unbridled discretion
in an obscenity case. But I also note that my appellate
colleagues do not have unbridled discretion on review. Our
function is to restrict both the legal and factual
determinations to the constitutional guidelines set forth in
Miller. Miller states that the elements of obscenity—prurient
interest, patent offensiveness and lack of serious value—are
to be determined by the trier of fact, i.e., the jury. 413
U.S. at 2 6 & n.9; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 308 (1977). Further, prurient interest and patent
offensiveness are to be measured by the test of an average
person in the community applying contemporary community
standards, which I will discuss in detail below. Thus, we must
give the jury's findings on those elements a fair measure of
deference, particularly in a close case. That does not mean
that obscenity convictions will be virtually unreviewable.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. But, " [determinations of prurient
interest and patent offensiveness, and also, therefore, of
contemporary community standards, are such as to indicate that
the major determination should be made by the jury, except in
the more extreme cases." F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity at
150-51 (1976)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter Schauer]. Since
the serious value element is to be measured by a "reasonable
person" standard, this determination is more amenable to
appellate review. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 305.
[I]t is also significant to note the
further indication of this decision

[Bantling vt United States, 418 u.s. 87
(1974)] that although all of the elements
of the Supreme Court's obscenity tests
have a constitutional basis, only the
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[serious] value standard is really a
question of fundamental constitutional
rights. The Other tests 9re mainly
questions of fact requiring a less rigid
standard of review.
Schauer at 125 (emphasis added).
Because the majority fails to recognize the proper scope of
appellate review, it answers the wrong question. Thus, the
analysis quickly adopts a finding that Turner's "renderings are
not public portrayals of hard core sexual conduct", i.e., the
renderings are not obscene. Our function is not to answer the
question of whether Turner's materials are obscene—as the
majority has done. Our function is to answer the question of
whether Turner's materials created a jury question as to
obscenity—as the majority has not done.
The appellate court should review each Miller element and
determine as to that element whether a jury issue has been
created. Instead, the majority disposes of the jury's obscenity
verdict by exercise of their own "hard core" judgment.
A.

The "Hard Core" Judgment

In Huffman, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit correctly observed that prior to 1971, the United States
Supreme Court had not defined the term "hard core"
pornography.2 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.9
(1971) rev'd, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
did not define "hard core" until 1973 in Miller which set forth
specific examples. If material which has failed to pass the
Miller tests for obscenity looks like something different than
Miller's examples, then the jury or trial judge has erred in
application of at least one of the tests. Schauer at 113. The
main opinion relies on Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162
(1974) as the basis of its obscenity determination, holding that
Turner's drawings do not depict "hard core" sexual conduct. But

2. The main opinion relies on Huffman, a pre-Jliiifit and
pre-Jenkins circuit case for language to support its "hard coreH
pornography argument. See nn. 7 & 8. Further, the opinion
utilizes Huffman to support its scope of review position.

the opinion fails to examine the meaning of "hard core."J Thus,
before examining our case in the light of Jenkins, I turn to
Miller for the definitive meaning of "hard core."
Miller states "for the first time since Roth fv. United
States, 354 U.S. 476J was decided in 1957, a majority of this
Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core*
pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). The Miller guidelines
include concrete examples of "hard core" materials. One of
those examples is "lewd exhibition of the genitals." I&. at
25. This example isolates as "hard core" the very materials
described in the St. George ordinance and exhibited by Turner.
His depictions and descriptions consist of genital imagery and
sexual conduct. Since Miller, the depiction of sexual conduct
does not necessarily require motion or activity.
Jenkins
3. Miller states that under its holding "no one will be subject
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive
'hard core* sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law. . . . "
Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. "Depict"
means to present a lifelike image of. Roaet's II, The New
Thesaurus 246 (1980). "Describe" means to give a verbal account
of. Id. at 250. Thus, "hard core" sexual conduct can be
presented in images or words.
4.

Professor Schauer has state,d:
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court
specifically stated that only the
depiction of "hard-core" sexual conduct
may be prohibited. As examples of what
might be included, the Court indicated the
following:
(a) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
This definition seems to make it clear
that hard-core pornography may include
things other than actual sexual congress
or activity, contrary to the views of a
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states that "we made it plain that under that holding fMiller!
'no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct . . . . ' "
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added)(quoting Miller, 413
U.S. at 27) .
Jenkins reiterates the following definitions of "hard core"
as first set forth in Miller:
We also took pains in Miller to
"give a few plain examples of what a state
statute could define for regulation under
part (b) of the standard announced," that
is, the requirement of patent
offensiveness. I&., at 25, 93 S.Ct., at
2615.
These examples include
"representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated," and "representations
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition Of the
genitals." Ibid- While this did not
purport to be an exhaustive catalog of
what juries might find patently offensive,

it was certainly intended to fi*
substantive constitutional limitations,
deriving from the Fir,st Amendment, on the
type of material subject to such a
determination. It would be wholly at odds
with this aspect of Miller to uphold an
obscenity conviction based upon a
defendant's depiction of a woman with a
bare midriff, even though a properly
charged jury unanimously agreed on a
verdict of guilty.
(Footnote 4 continued)
number of other courts prior to Miller.
These views seemed based primarily on the
BfilitllE [vt New YorK, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)]
reversals of the Supreme Court, since for
a number of years after 1967 the Court
reversed any obscenity conviction where
the material did not display actual sexual
activity, regardless of the lewd or
suggestive poses of individual models.
Schauer at 111.

Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added). Jenkins was a
"bare midriff" case. Our case is not. Miller does not mention
bare midriffs or mere nudity. Miller specifically defines lewd
exhibition of the "genitals." This is our case. In Jenkins
the Supreme Court viewed the film Carnal Knowledge and observed:
While the subject matter of the picture
is, in a broader sense, sex, and there are
scenes in which sexual conduct including
"ultimate sexual acts" is to be understood
to be taking place, the camera does not
focus on the bodies of the actors at such
times. There is no exhibition whatever of
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise,
during these scenes. There are occasional
scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not
enough to make material legally obscene

under the Miller standards,
Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
Having observed that the film depicted "nudity" only and
not "genitals", the Supreme Court held that "the film could
not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. . . . "
Id. at
161.
Jenkins and Miller both tell us what can be defined as
"hard core," i.e., lewd exhibition of the genitals. Jenkins
tells us one thing that can not be considered "hard core,"
i.e., a bare midriff. Jenkins pimply does not grant my
colleagues discretion on review to hold as a matter of
constitutional law that Turner's depictions and exhibition of
female genitalia were clearly not obscene and did not create an
issue for the jury. To the contrary, Jenkins and Miller stand
for the proposition that St. George could define, and prohibit
as "hard core" obscenity, the lewd exhibition of the
genitals—even if only by "representation." Miller. 413 U.S.
at 25. The St. George ordinance adopted the Miller
definition. Professor Schauer has stated:
But now, after Miller, it is clear that
hard-core pornography may include material
which does not depict sexual acts, and
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" is
specifically included. This should be
interpreted in the light of a number of
lower court cases defining hard-core
pornography to include photographs which
focus on, exaggerate, or emphasize the
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genitalia or "erogenous zones." It is
this exaggeration or "highlight" on the
genitalia which often distinguishes
hard-core pornography from mere nudity.
Schauer at 111-112.
Turner elected to exhibit materials which highlight and
amplify female genitalia, one of Miller's specific examples of
"hard core." In fact, Turner described the vulva drawing as:
"It's supposed to be a very-enlarged portion of the girl's
pubic area" and the "tunnel of love" represents "a girl's
vagina." Turner's depictions are a form of hard core
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed
depictions set forth in Miller and the St. George ordinance.
Accordingly, Turner's materials were sufficient to clearly
present a jury issue as to obscenity. As promised, I now turn
to further consideration of the average person test because the
majority has not given proper deference to this test and has
substituted their own personal judgments for that of the jury.
B.
i^

The Average Person Test

Test Applies to Prurient Interest and Patently Offensive

Elements
In 1957, Roth replaced the "most susceptible" person test
of obscenity with the "average person" test. Miller reaffirmed
this test by reciting Roth:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact
must be: (a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
The Miller Court rejected a national "community standard"
as an exercise in futility. In so doing, the Court relied on
the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964) which stated:
It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of
Maine or Mississippi accept public

depiction of conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas, or New York City. People in
different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be
strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity.
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted).
In accord with the above rationale, the Miller Court held
"that obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary
community standards', 'not national standards1." Miller, 413
U.S. at 31-32. Miller analyzed this new standard in relation
to both the prurient interest and the patent offensiveness
tests. Both of those tests require a less rigid standard of
review because they are principally questions of fact. The
jurors are to apply this standard as would the average person
in their community. Accordingly, the jurors' analytical
process is as follows: (1) determine, from their own knowledge
of the community, the sense of the average person in the
community; (2) determine from their own knowledge of the
community contemporary community standards; (3) apply those
standards to the work in question and make judgments regarding
appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness. If
these judgments by the jury are in the affirmative, the work is
obscene. If either of these judgments is in the negative, the
work is not obscene. Thus, only the serious value element of
Miller presents a question regarding fundamental constitutional
rights. S_S£, e.g. , Schauer at, 125.
If the work is obscene,
the jury then determines whether it has serious value which
would save it. This is done by applying the reasonable person
test. Pope v. Illinois. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).

2^

The Average Person

Who is the mysterious average person? He or she is
neither the most immune nor the most susceptible. "[Ojbscenity
is to be judged according to the average person in the
community/ rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant."

Smith Vt United States, 431 u.s. 291, 304 (1977).

The Miller

opinion stated the primary concern in requiring a jury to apply
this standard is that the material "will be judged by its
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly
susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally
insensitive one." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33- I note the
continuing emphasis that it is the individual juror who must
divine the standards of the average person in the local
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community. Because this factual judgment is to be exercised by
the peer juror, the prosecution need not produce "expert"
witnesses to testify as to obscenity. Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1973). The juror knows as well as any
expert who the average person is and what the contemporary
community standards are. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973). The Supreme Court has stated:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own
knowledge of the views of the average
person in the community or vicinage from
which he comes for making the required
determination, just as he is entitled to
draw on his knowledge of the propensities
of a "reasonable" person in other areas of
the law.
Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974), quoted in
Smith, 431 U.S. at 302.
This standard requires each juror to tap his or her
knowledge of his or her community in deciding what obscenity
conclusion the average person in the community, applying
contemporary community standards, would reach in a particular
case. Thus, the appellate judge has a formidable, if not
impossible task, in second guessing the juror's personal draw
on his or her "knowledge of the community." How does the
appellate judge divine the sense of the average person in a
distant community where the appellate judge does not reside or
has little, if any, personal knowledge of community mores on
which to draw? Expert witnesses? Not required. "[I]n 'the
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since
Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves
for the determination of the question.'" Kaplan, 413 U.S. at
122 (quoting Ginzbura v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465
(1966)). How about the local statute? Introduced here.
Helpful evidence, but not conclusive. "[T]he local statute on
obscenity provides relevant evidence of the mores of the
community whose legislative body enacted the law." Smith, 431
U.S. at 308. Smith held, as did Miller, that the issues of
prurient interest and patent offensiveness "are fact questions
for the jury, to be judged in the light of the jurors'
understanding of contemporary community standards." Id. at
300-01. Thus, we see that the jury is uniquely qualified to
exercise this particular judgment, i.e., the average person
applying contemporary community standards. They must "consider
the entire community and not simply their own subjective
reactions or the reactions, of a sensitive or of a callous

minority." Id. at 305. And in this case, my appellate
colleagues have little evidence of local community standards
other than the juror's judgment which has been exercised.5
Here, the basic evidence of community mores was each juror's
personal knowledge of local standards and the St. George
ordinance. The St. George ordinance contains the Miller
definitions of hard core obscenity. The ordinance is
substantial evidence of a community standard that genitalia
will not be lewdly depicted and displayed to the public.
Turner elected to exhibit genitalia, as proscribed, to the
unwarned members of the public including juveniles who entered
his place of business. His public exhibition of hard core
materials created questions for the jury regarding prurient
interest and patent offensiveness. The jury applied the
"average person" test under contemporary community standards
and found in the affirmative. Again, the majority has not
definitively answered the question of whether a jury question
had been created on these issues. Instead, the majority,
without acknowledging the "average person" test simply
substitutes their individual judgments for the judgments
exercised by the jury and summarily announce their own factual
findings (dressed up as conclusions of law) in the negative
stating:
Because we conclude . . . that the
drawings themselves do not appeal to the
prurient interest and are not patently
offensive and because the drawings
rationally relate to the rest of the
collage . . . taken as a whole . . . we
find the drawings are not in violation of
the St. George Ordinance.
TURNER'S WORK "AS A WHOLE"
Since the majority concluded that Turner's work failed the
"hard core" requirement, that should have been the end of the
5. The defense called four witnesses ostensibly to testify
regarding community standards. One had purchased some "mens'"
magazines at some convenience stores in Washington County.
Another had seen "R" rated movies in St. George, including Sea
of Love and Skin Deep, but no "X" rated movies. One indicated
that there were literary works available in Southern Utah which
contained the "F" word, and the last described the place of
nudes in 20th century art. None testified as "experts" nor
stated "expert opinions" regarding community standards.
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opinion, as in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) on which
they rely. Nevertheless, the opinion tries to further save the
work from the jury's obscenity determination by analyzing
Turner's work "as a whole."6
A.

Context or Unit of Perception

Obscenity cases have dealt with a book, a movie, a
magazine article, a cartoon, a brochure, each as a unit of
perception.
What material displayed by Turner is the logical
6. The majority tries to save Turner's work from the jury's
obscenity determination by relying completely on the curious
per curiam case of Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972). for
its "as a whole" analysis. I observe some problems with'this
reliance on Kois.
First, Kois was a pre-Miller case. Kois is divided into
two sections using different analyses to dispose of two
separate criminal offenses: (1) an underground newspaper
article which included a photo of a nude couple embracing and
(2) a book of poems which included a poem describing sexual
intercourse.
Second, since Kois was a pre-Miller, "national" community
standards case, the Supreme Court's scope of review was broader
than it would be post-Miller, applying "local" community
standards.
Third, Miller requires a different analytical approach
than was applied in the sex poem section of Kois. There, the
Court looked at the "artistic" value of the poem in question
and considered it to be in the realm of "serious art." From
that premise, the Court decided the dominant theme of the poem
did not appeal to the prurient interest. Under Miller "serious
value" of the work is examined last and only after the work has
failed the prurient interest and patent offensiveness tests.
If so, "serious value" is examined to determine if the work has
value which can save it.
7. The trial judge, the jurors and the appellate judges should
observe the complete "work" as a unit of perception. See
generally Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (book);
Jenkins v. Georgia. 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (movie); Penthouse

Intern.t Ltd. v, McAuliffe, 6io F.2d 1353 (5th cir.), cert.
dismissed/ 447 U.S. 931 (1980) (magazine); Paoish v. Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam)(political cartoon);
Hamlina v. United States. 418 U.S. 87 (1984) (advertising
brochure).

unit of perception? The prosecution offered two separate
sheets as units of perception each depicting offensive
material. Turner testified that one of the sheets which
contained, among other slogans and depictions, the words "Group
Sex" and "Eat It, Eat Me" was prepared four years earlier as
part of a Halloween motif. Accordingly, it did not bear any
time relation or context relation to the other sheet depicting
the nude and vulva. Further, Turner's counsel argued to the
trial court that the two sheets were "totally" separate and
different works. The main opinion disregards Turner's view and
identifies Turner's "hard rock record store," including the
"collage" of wall hangings, as the unit of perception. I agree
with Turner and his counsel that the logical unit of perception
is to view each of Turner's sheets as separate "paintings" or
works. Turner's painting (sheet depicting the nude female and
vulva), described in detail in my "facts" section above', is the
work or unit of perception at issue in this case. Thus, the
single sheet is the "work" to be "taken as a whole" in the
analysis.
B.

Dominant Theme

The question to be asked by trial judge, jury and
appellate judge is:
whether the objectionable materials are
related to text or other materials which
are themselves constitutionally protected,
or whether the text'[or other materials
are] merely asserted as a sham to attempt
to shield commercial pornography in a
cloak of legitimacy.
Schauer at 106.
Turner was unable to articulate any text or theme for the
materials on his painting exclusive of the nude and vulva. His
testimony reveals that he had no clear theme. He was not sure,
but he believed his painting "resembles political commentary."
Even Turner's brief concedes that the theme of his "bed sheets
is admittedly difficult to identify precisely.- Thus, the
jury, applying the "average person test" could reasonably
conclude that the objectionable sexual depictions and
descriptions could not possibly relate to the other materials
on the sheet because they were themeless, i.e., a diverse
collection of ideas. Further, even if the other materials set
forth a clear "political" theme, the jury could reasonably
conclude that the "sexual" materials had nothing to do with
politics. Moreover, since Turner testified that the two sexual

depictions were the first materials placed on the sheets (and
the other materials added later had no theme or were not
related, if they had a theme), the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the materials added to the top of the sheet were
indeed a sham attempt by Turner to insulate or shield obscene
material (the lower half of the sheet) with non-obscene
material. Turner could not identify a dominant theme.8 Since
he could not, the jury had a basis on which to conclude that
Turner's "themeless" materials were merely a sham attempt to
insulate his "objectionable" materials.
This would occur, for example, if the most
obscene items conceivable were inserted
between each of the books of the Bible.
But under existing law, the judges and
juries are able to identify shams in which
non-obscene material is used as a vehicle
to insulate obscene material. As
established in Ginzburq, the "taken as a
whole" test is not quantitative. Under
Miller, even one obscene item contained in
a work would be sufficient to support a
finding that the entire publication is
obscene if, "taken as a whole," the
publication lacks serious value. The
"taken as a whole" test is not
inconsistent with the recognition of shams.
Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1368 (5th
Cir. 1980)(footnote omitted).
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8. The majority creates a "rational relationship" among
Turner's diverse "political, philosophical, musical, social and
sexual themes" by calling his work a collage. Thus, several
entirely unrelated themes are made the "dominant theme" of the
majority with the store as the "context." Accordingly, the
offensive depictions, as part of the collage, in this large
context, are simply meaningless, i.e., not obscene.

